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Massachusetts Appeals Court Summary Dispositions Pursuant to Rule 23.0 (formerly Rule 1:28)

Docket Number - 23-P-0011main content

 

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COMMONWEALTH vs. JSHAWN L. DURHAM.
4/22/2024
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-11
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
JSHAWN L. DURHAM.
1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The probationer appeals from the denial of his motion to
terminate and discharge probation by a judge of the District
Court, and an order finding him in violation of his probation
and extending the term of probation for another year. He argues
that he adequately established an inability to pay restitution,
ordered as a condition of probation, due to his poverty.
Concluding that the judge committed an error of law in his
application of Commonwealth v. Henry, 475 Mass. 117, 121-127
(2016), we vacate the denial and order, and remand the matter.
We review a judge's determination that a probation
violation occurred and their disposition of a probation
1
In affidavits, the probationer spelled his name "Jshawn
Durham" and "J'Shawn L. Durham." As is our custom, we spell the
probationer's name as it was spelled in the complaints.
2
violation for abuse of discretion or other error of law. See
Commonwealth v. Pena, 462 Mass. 183, 187 (2012); Commonwealth v.
Grant G., 96 Mass. App. Ct. 721, 725 (2019). The Commonwealth
bears the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of
the evidence. Commonwealth v. Bukin, 467 Mass. 516, 520 (2014).
"A defendant can be found in violation of a probationary
condition only where the violation was wilful, and the failure
to make a restitution payment that the probationer is unable to
pay is not a wilful violation of probation." Henry, 475 Mass.
at 121. The probationer bears the burden of showing an
inability to pay. Id.
At a 2022 probation violation hearing,
2
the probationer
filed a motion to terminate and discharge probation based on his
inability to pay the remaining restitution (Henry motion),
asserting via affidavit and representations of counsel
3
that he
was unable to pay. The District Court judge denied the motion,
stating that Henry motions are for "people who are physically or
mentally disabled who have no capacity to work, not that they
lost their job during COVID." This reads Henry too narrowly.
2
The probationer pleaded guilty and was sentenced in 2014,
before Henry issued. The probationer's initial eighteen-month
probation term has been repeatedly extended for failure to pay
restitution.
3
See Commonwealth v. Pereira, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 146, 151
(2018) ("Assertions of . . . counsel are not evidence").
3
In fact, to ensure equal justice, the Supreme Judicial Court
determined that a "criminal defendant should not face additional
punishment solely because of [their] poverty." Henry, 475 Mass.
at 122. Accordingly, "[i]n determining the defendant's ability
to pay, the judge must consider the financial resources of the
defendant, including income and net assets, and the defendant's
financial obligations, including the amount necessary to meet
minimum basic human needs such as food, shelter, and clothing
for the defendant and [their] dependents." Id. at 126. Payment
of restitution must not impose a "substantial financial
hardship" on the defendant, such as "payments that would deprive
the defendant or [their] dependents of minimum basic human
needs." Id. at 127. While "[a] judge may also consider a
defendant's ability to earn based on 'the defendant's employment
history and financial prospects,' . . . a judge may attribute
potential income to the defendant only after specifically
finding that the defendant is earning less than [they] could
through reasonable effort" (citation omitted). Id.
Because the motion judge expressly applied an incorrect
rationale in denying the probationer's motion, he abused his
discretion. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brusgulis, 398 Mass.
325, 330 (1986) (decision of motion judge may be vacated where
judge applied incorrect legal standard). Further, while "the
defendant bore the burden of persuasion, . . . the judge's
4
findings were inadequate to support the conclusion that the
defendant had an ability to pay restitution." Commonwealth v.
Vallejo, 480 Mass. 1001, 1002 (2018). Accordingly, the judge
also abused his discretion for using the lack of payment as the
basis of the probation violation and subsequently extending the
probationer's probation. We must therefore remand for findings
in accordance with Henry.
4
Should the reviewing judge, applying
the correct standard, conclude that the probationer has the
ability to pay based on an ability to find work, the judge must
articulate the grounds on which the judge is attributing income
to the probationer, after considering his "employment history
and financial prospects" and any other relevant circumstances.
Henry, 475 Mass. at 127.
The order denying the probationer's motion to terminate
probation and the order finding the probationer in violation of
probation and extending his probation for another year on the
4
Generalized and uncorroborated assertions by the
probationer about their financial situation are not adequate.
Compare Commonwealth v. Bruno-O'Leary, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 44, 46-
51 (2018) (defendant carried burden where she testified,
provided revised detailed affidavit, and produced supporting
documents in form of proof of Social Security benefits and a
lease), with Pereira, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at 151-152 (where
defendant had previously agreed to payment schedule and failed
to present any evidence in support of Henry motion, even
affidavit, judge did not err in finding violation based on
failure to pay).
5
same payment terms are vacated, and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.
So ordered.
By the Court (Green, C.J.,
Henry & Ditkoff, JJ. ),
5
Assistant Clerk
Entered: April 22, 2024.
5
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.