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Massachusetts Appeals Court Summary Dispositions Pursuant to Rule 23.0 (formerly Rule 1:28)

Docket Number - 23-P-0162main content

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CHICOPEE HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. MICHAEL S. BOUTIN (and a consolidated case).
4/25/2024
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-162
CHICOPEE HOUSING AUTHORITY
vs.
MICHAEL S. BOUTIN (and a consolidated case ).
1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The Chicopee Housing Authority (landlord) filed a summary
process action seeking to evict the defendant (tenant) for
alleged violations of the terms of his lease. After a bench
trial, a Housing Court judge found that the landlord met its
burden of proving that the tenant substantially breached his
lease by interfering with another resident's right to quiet
enjoyment of his home. The judge twice deferred entry of
judgment, however, to allow the tenant to preserve his tenancy
by accepting a transfer to another unit. When the tenant
refused to accept the transfer, judgment for possession entered
for the landlord.
1
The consolidated case involves the same parties.
2
The judge then held a second bench trial on the tenant's
counterclaims for interference with quiet enjoyment and breach
of the implied warranty of habitability, which had been severed
from the summary process action. See Spence v. O'Brien, 15
Mass. App. Ct. 489, 499 (1983) (G. L. c. 239, § 8A, which
authorizes conditions-based counterclaims or defenses in summary
process actions, does not apply where landlord's claim for
possession is premised on tenant's fault). The judge found that
the evidence adduced at trial did not support any of the
tenant's counterclaims, and judgment for the landlord entered
accordingly.
The tenant filed timely notices of appeal from both
judgments. The appeals were consolidated in this court and are
now before us.
The tenant's briefs, which we have reviewed carefully, do
not contain a concise statement of the issues, a statement of
the applicable standard of review, or any citation to the record
or legal authority, as required by the rules of appellate
procedure. See Mass. R.A.P. 16 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass.
1628 (2019). While we acknowledge and accept the tenant's
representation that he did his best, "[t]he fact that the
[tenant] represents himself does not excuse his noncompliance
with procedural rules." Brossard v. West Roxbury Div. of the
Dist. Court Dep't, 417 Mass. 183, 184 (1994). Even with
3
considerable leniency, we cannot discern from the tenant's
briefs precisely what issues he is raising on appeal and are
thus unable to engage in meaningful appellate review.
Nonetheless, given the tenant's pro se status, we have
independently reviewed the judge's decisions and, after doing
so, see no basis on which to disturb either of them. On review
of a judgment after a bench trial, "we accept [the judge's]
findings of fact as true unless they are clearly erroneous, and
we give due regard to the judge's assessment of the witnesses'
credibility." Andover Hous. Auth. v. Shkolnik, 443 Mass. 300,
306 (2005). Both of the judge's decisions here were based on
his weighing of the evidence and his assessment of witness
credibility, to which we must defer. See Saipe v. Sullivan &
Co., Inc., 487 Mass. 1001, 1004 (2021). None of the judge's
findings have been shown to be clearly erroneous.
We have also considered the tenant's allegations, all
unsupported by citation to the record, that the judge was
biased. To the extent the tenant's claim is based on the
judge's rulings, adverse rulings alone are insufficient to
establish judicial bias except "'in the rarest circumstances'
where they 'reveal such a high degree of favoritism or
antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible,'" which is far
from the case here. Passero v. Fitzsimmons, 92 Mass. App. Ct.
76, 83 (2017), quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
4
555 (1994). To the extent the tenant is claiming bias arising
from an extrajudicial source, there is no evidence in the record
to support such a claim.
In sum, the tenant has failed to show that he is entitled
to relief from either of the judgments, which are therefore
affirmed.
Judgment dated December 6,
2021, affirmed.
Judgment dated June 16, 2022,
affirmed.
By the Court (Vuono, Shin &
Toone, JJ. ),
2
Assistant Clerk
Entered: April 25, 2024.
2
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.